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1 Quantum data locking is a quantum phenomenon that allows us to en-
crypt a long message with a small secret key with information-theoretic security.
This is in sharp contrast with classical information theory where, according to
Shannon, the secret key needs to be at least as long as the message. Here we
explore photonic architectures for quantum data locking, where information is
encoded in multi-photon states and processed using multi-mode linear optics
and photo-detection, with the goal of extending an initial secret key into a
longer one. The secret key consumption depends on the number of modes and
photons employed. In the no-collision limit, where the likelihood of photon
bunching is suppressed, the key consumption is shown to be logarithmic in
the dimensions of the system. Our protocol can be viewed as an application of
the physics of Boson Sampling to quantum cryptography. Experimental realisa-
tions are challenging but feasible with state-of-the-art technology, as techniques
recently used to demonstrate Boson Sampling can be adapted to our scheme
(e.g., Phys. Rev. Lett. 123, 250503, 2019).
1 Introduction
In classical information theory, a celebrated result of Shannon states that a message of
N bits can only be encrypted using a secret key of at least N bits [1]. This result, which
lays the foundation of the security of the one-time pad, does not necessarily apply when
information is encoded into a quantum state of matter or light.
The phenomenon of Quantum Data Locking (QDL), first discovered by DiVincenzo et
al. [2], shows that a message of N bits, when encoded into a quantum system, can be
encrypted with a secret key of k ≪ N bits. QDL guarantees information-theoretic security
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against an adversary who is forced to measure their share of the quantum system as soon
as they obtain it, for example because they do not have a quantum memory [3], or after a
known time, for example if they have a quantum memory with limited storage time [4, 5].
In QDL, a secret key of k bits is used to uniquely identify a code, i.e., a basis among a given
set of 2k orthogonal bases in a Hilbert space of dimensions d. The elements of said basis
are then used to reliably encode N bits of information. It is known that there exist choices
of k ≪ N bases such that only a negligibly small amount of information, as quantified by
the accessible information, will leak if one attempts to measure the quantum state without
knowing the secret key [6, 7]. From a physical point of view, this is related to the fact that
the 2k bases correspond to non-commuting observables [8, 9].
Initial works on QDL focused on abstract protocols that required control over an asymp-
totically large Hilbert space, including, for example, the ability to sample random unitaries
according to the Haar measure [6, 7], or to perform universal quantum computation [7].
Some more recent works have instead explored practical protocols that only require moder-
ate control over a Hilbert space of relatively small size [3, 4, 10–12]. This has led to one of
the first experimental demonstrations of QDL [13] (see also Ref. [14]). In this experiment,
information was encoded into the transverse wave-vector of an heralded photon, and an
array of spatial light modulators was used to generate pseudo-random unitary transforma-
tions of the single-photon wave front. A setup encoding information in time of arrival was
discussed in Ref. [15].
In this paper, we define and characterize a family of QDL protocols that encode infor-
mation using n photons scattered over m optical modes. Examples include spatial modes,
temporal modes, and angular momentum [16]. The goal of these protocols is to extend an
initial secret key into a longer one. While encoding information using 1 photon over m
modes is more practical, it is also highly inefficient as it encodes no more than (logm)/m
bits per mode. By contrast, using multiple photons we can encode up to 1 bit per mode.
As our QDL protocols are well defined also for relatively small values of n and m, experi-
mental demonstrations are feasible with current state-of-the-art technology. In particular,
the same techniques used to demonstrate Boson Sampling can be adapted to multiphoton
multimode QDL [17–19].
Extending the theoretical security analysis of QDL to multiphoton states presents some
technical challenges that we address and solve here. These challenges are related to the
peculiar properties of the group of linear optical passive (LOP) unitaries. LOP unitaries
define a representation of the group U(m), which becomes irreducible in the subspaces
with definite photon number n [20]. Hence previous proof techniques that are based on
the properties of the fundamental representation of U(m) cannot be directly applied to
characterise multiphoton QDL.
The structure of the paper follows. In Sec. 2 we introduce the formalism of QDL. In
Sec. 3 we describe our protocol. Preliminary considerations are presented in Sec. 4, and
our main results are in Sec. 5. Mathematical proofs are discussed in Secs. 6 and 7. Noisy
communication channels are addressed in Sec. 8. Section 9 is for conclusions. Technical
results are given in the Appendices A-E.
2 Quantum data locking
A typical QDL protocol requires a sender (conventionally called Alice) and a receiver (Bob)
that can communicate through a quantum channel. Each use of the communication channel
allows Alice to transfer a quantum state that lives in a Hilbert space of dimensions d.
The general form of a QDL protocol follows (Fig. 1).
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Figure 1: Circuit layout of the QDL protocol. The code words |ψj〉 are chosen from the
(
m
n
)
possible
permutations of n photons in m modes. Alice and Bob share a secret key in advance, which Alice uses
to encrypt her photonic input message by applying a unitary U . Bob decrypt by applying the inverse
operation U−1.
1. In advance, Alice and Bob publicly agree upon a set of K unitary matrices in U(d),
say {Uk}k=1,...,K . Each unitary matrix identifies a basis in the Hilbert space, which
is obtained by applying the unitary to the standard computational basis. Denote as
{|j〉}j=1,...,d the elements of the computational basis. Then the unitary Uk identifies
the basis {Uk|j〉}j=1,...,d.
2. To send information to Bob, first Alice uses a secret key of logK bits to choose one
particular unitary transformation, i.e., one particular basis in the agreed set of K
bases.
3. Alice selects M basis vectors, {Uk|jx〉}x=1,...,M from the chosen basis and use them
as a code to send logM bits of classical information through the quantum channel.
This encoding of classical information into a quantum system A is described by the
classical-quantum state
ρkXA =
1
M
M
∑
x=1
|x〉X〈x| ⊗ Uk|jx〉A〈jx|U
†
k , (1)
where X is the classical variable encoded by Alice, which is represented by a set of
M orthogonal vectors {|x〉}x=1,...,M in a dummy quantum system.
In this work we assume that different code words have equal probability. As the goal
of the protocol is to extend an initial secret key into a longer one, using equally probable
code words is a natural assumption. It makes the analysis of the QDL protocol easier,
although it can be relaxed [21, 22].
The code words prepared by Alice are then sent to Bob through a quantum channel
described as a completely positive and trace preserving map NA→B that transforms Alice’s
system A into Bob’s system B. The channel maps the state in Eq. (1) into
ρkXB =
1
M
M
∑
x=1
|x〉X〈x| ⊗ NA→B
(
Uk|jx〉A〈jx|U
†
k
)
. (2)
We ask a QDL protocol to have the properties of correctness and security.
Correctness. The property of correctness requires that, if Bob knows the secret key
used by Alice to chose the code words, then he is able to decode reliably. For example, if
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the channel is noiseless, then N is the identity map and
ρkXB =
1
M
M
∑
x=1
|x〉X〈x| ⊗ Uk|jx〉A〈jx|U
†
k . (3)
In this case, Bob can simply apply the inverse unitary, U−1k , followed by a measurement
in the computational basis. In this way, Bob can decode with no error for any M ≤ d.
If the channel is noisy, Alice and Bob can still communicate reliably at a certain rate
of r < log d bits per channel use. This is possible by using error correction at any rate
below the channel capacity, rmax = I(X;Y |K) [23]. Here I(X;Y |K) denotes the mutual
information between the input variable X and the output of Bob’s measurement Y , given
the shared secret key K. Notice that here we need classical error correction and not
quantum error correction, as the goal of Alice and Bob is to exchange classical information
and not quantum information. Furthermore, we apply post facto error correction, as it is
commonly done in quantum key distribution [24], in which error correcting information is
sent independently on a classical authenticated public channel.
We emphasize the importance of the assumption that the adversary has no quantum
memory for the security of post facto error correction. This assumption guarantees that a
potential eavesdropper has already measured their share of the quantum system when the
error correction information is exchanged on a public channel. If b bits of error correcting
information are communicated on a public channel, then the eavesdropper cannot learn
more than b bits of information about the message 2. If instead the eavesdropper has a
quantum memory with storage time τ , then Alice and Bob need to wait for a time larger
than τ after the quantum signal have been transmitted and before proceeding with post
facto error correction. In this work we assume that Alice and Bob know an upper bound
on τ .
Security. The property of security requires that, if Bob does not know the secret key,
he can obtain no more than a negligibly small amount of information about Alice’s input
variable X. To clarify this, consider that, if Bob does not know the secret key used by
Alice, then his description of the classical quantum state is the average of Eq. (2),
ρXB =
1
K
K
∑
k=1
1
M
M
∑
x=1
|x〉X〈x| ⊗ NA→B
(
Uk|jx〉A〈jx|U
†
k
)
. (4)
In QDL, the security is quantified using the accessible information [2, 6] (or similar quan-
tities [7, 21, 25]). Recall that the accessible information Iacc(X;B)σ is defined as the
maximum information that Bob can obtain about X by measuring his share of the state
σ, that is,
Iacc(X;B)σ = max
MB→Y
I(X;Y ) , (5)
where the optimization is over the measurement maps MB→Y on system B, and I(X;Y ) is
the mutual information between X and the outcome Y of the measurement. The security
2To see that the public channel for error correction does not render the protocol insecure, we note that
Eve’s additional information about the secret key is bounded by classical information theory as follows. Let
X be the message sent by Alice, Z the output of Eve’s measurement, and I(X;Z) the mutual information.
After error correction, Eve obtains a bit string C(X). Hence, we need to consider the mutual information
I(X;ZC(X)). It follows from the property of incremental proportionality [2] of the mutual information
that I(X;ZC(X)) ≤ I(X;Z) + H(C(X)), where H(C(X)) is the entropy of C(X). This implies that,
knowing C(X) after she measured the quantum system, Eve cannot learn more than H(C(X)) bits about
the message X.
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property can be defined in different ways, depending on how the state σ is chosen. Here
we consider a strong notion of QDL [3] and put
σXB =
1
K
K
∑
k=1
1
M
M
∑
x=1
|x〉X〈x| ⊗ Uk|jx〉A〈jx|U
†
k . (6)
This is equivalent to saying that the information remains encrypted even if Bob is capable
of accessing the quantum resource directly without the mediation of a noisy channel. The
data processing inequality [23] then implies that the protocol is secure for noisy channels
too. In conclusion, we say that the protocol is secure if Iacc(X;B) = O(ǫ logM), with
ǫ arbitrarily small. This means that only a negligible fraction of the information can be
obtained by measuring the quantum state without having knowledge of the secret key.
Intuitively, we expect that the larger K, the smaller the accessible information. This
intuition has been proven true using tools from large deviation theory and coding theory
[4, 6, 7]. The mathematical characterization of a QDL protocol consists in obtaining, for
given ǫ > 0, an estimate of the minimum integer Kǫ such that there exist choices of K = Kǫ
bases that guarantee Iacc(X;Y ) = O(ǫ logM).
Finally, the net secret key rate that can be established between Alice and Bob, through
a noisy communication channel N , is
rQDL = βI(X;Y |K) − logKǫ , (7)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the efficiency of error correction, and we have subtracted the initial
amount logKǫ of secret bits shared between Alice and Bob. We emphasise that the mutual
information I(X;Y |K) depends on the particular noisy channel, whilst logKǫ is universal.
The noisier the channel, the smaller I(X;Y |K), which accounts for the error correction
overhead. The factor β accounts for the fact that practical error correction requires more
overhead than expected in theory.
3 Multiphoton encoding
Let n photons be sent into m optical modes of an interferometer with at most one photon
per input mode. The input modes â evolve into U âU †, with U the unitary transformation
describing the interferometer:
Ua†iU
† =
m
∑
j=1
Ui,ja
†
j . (8)
A passive multi-mode interferometer realises a unitary transformation that preserves
the total photon number. The set of all possible transformations that can be realised in
this way defines the group of linear passive optical (LOP) unitary transformations, which is
isomorphic to the m-dimensional unitary group U(m) (see e.g. Ref. [20]). By Shur’s lemma,
the group of LOP unitaries has irreducible representations in the subspaces with definite
photon number. For applications to photonic QDL, the representation with 1 photon has
been studied in previous works [3, 10]. This representation has the unique feature of being
the fundamental representation of U(m). However, representations with higher photon
number that we are considering here are no longer the fundamental representation.
The output from the interferometer prior to photo-detection can be expanded in the
photon-number basis:
|ψout〉 =
∑
n
λn |n1n2 . . . nm〉 , (9)
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where n = (n1, n2, . . . , nm) denotes a photon-number configuration with ni photons in the
i-th mode and λn its amplitude.
The aim of this paper is to characterize a particular family of QDL protocols, where
information is encoded into m ≥ 2 optical modes using n > 1 photons. We define the code
words by putting photons on different modes, with no more than one photon per mode.
In this way we obtain a code book Cmn that contains C =
(m
n
)
code words, whereas the
overall Hilbert space defined by n photons on m modes has dimensions d =
(n+m−1
n
)
(this
includes states with more than one photon in a given mode). For example, with m = 4
modes and n = 1 photon, we have the C = 4 code words |1000〉, |0100〉, |0010〉, |0001〉.
With n = 2 photons, we instead obtain the C = 6 code words |1100〉, |0011〉, |1001〉, |0110〉,
|1010〉, |0101〉.
The two users, Alice and Bob, are linked via an optical communication channel that
allows Alice to send m optical modes at the time. Initially, we assume the channel is
noiseless. Later we will extend to the case of a noisy channel. The goal of the protocol,
which is shown schematically in Fig. 1, is for Alice and Bob to expand an initial secret key
of logK bits into a longer one.
For given n and m, Alice defines a code book C̄mn by choosing a subset of M < C code
words from Cmn . The code book is publicly announced. We denote the code words as |ψx〉,
with x = 1, . . . ,M . To encrypt these code words, Alice applies an m-mode LOP unitary
transformation from a set of K elements {Uk}k=1,...,K . The unitary is determined by the
value of her secret key of logK bits. We recall that any LOP unitary can be realised as a
network of beam splitters and phase shifters [26, 27].
We can directly verify the correctness property for a noiseless communication channel.
In this case, Bob, who knows the secret key, applies U−1k and measures by photo-detection.
He is then able to decrypt logM bits of information with no error. This implies that Alice
and Bob can establish a key of logM bits for each round of the protocol.
To characterise the secrecy of the QDL protocol, we need to identify the minimum key
size Kǫ. This is the task that we accomplish in the following sections below.
4 Preliminary considerations
Before presenting our main results, we need to introduce some notation and preliminary
results. First, consider the following state,
ρ̄B := EU [U |ψ〉〈ψ|U
†] =
∫
dU U |ψ〉〈ψ|U † , (10)
which is defined by taking the average over the LOP unitary U acting on a state ψ. Here
EU denotes the expectation value over the invariant measure (i.e., the Haar measure) on
the group LOP unitary transformations acting on m optical modes. The choice of the
invariant measure is somewhat arbitrary and other measures can be used, see e.g. Ref.
[28]. In Eq. (10), ψ is a vector in the code book Cmn . By symmetry, ρ̄B is independent of
ψ.
Consider, as an example, the manifold of states with n = 3 photons over m = 4 modes.
We denote as H(1,1,1,0) the subspace spanned by vectors that have at most one photon in
each mode, i.e., the linear span of |1110〉, |1101〉, |1011〉, |0111〉. The subspace H(1,1,1,0) is
characterised by a specific pattern describing how photons are distributed on the modes.
Another subspace is H(2,1,0,0), which is spanned by the vectors |2100〉, |2010〉..., etc. Finally,
there exists one more photon pattern for m = 4 modes and n = 3 photons, denoted as q =
(3, 0, 0, 0). The corresponding subspace H(3,0,0,0) is spanned by the vectors |3000〉, |0300〉,
Accepted in Quantum 2021-04-19, click title to verify. Published under CC-BY 4.0. 6
|0030〉, |0003〉. We label the different subspaces by q ∈ {(1, 1, 1, 0), (2, 1, 0, 0), (3, 0, 0, 0)}.
These definitions naturally extend to any n and m. In general, a patter of n photons over
m modes is identified as (n1, n2, . . . , nm), for integers nj ≥ nj+1 such that
∑m
j=1 nj = n.
We denote as Hq the corresponding subspace, and Pq is the projector onto Hq.
By symmetry, the state ρ̄B is block-diagonal in the subspaces Hq, i.e.,
ρ̄B =
∑
q
cqPq . (11)
We are particularly interested in the smallest coefficient in this expansion,
cmin := min
q
cq , (12)
which can be computed numerically for given n and m. Examples are shown in Table 1.
The results of our numerical estimations suggest that the minimum is always achieved for
the pattern qmin = (1, 1, 1, .., 0, 0), i.e., when each mode contains at most 1 photon. An
analytical expression for c(1,1,1,..,0,0) is given in Ref. [29],
c(1,1,1,..,0,0) =
(
m+ n− 1
n
)−1
=
1
d
. (13)
Supported by the results of our numerical search, we formulate the following conjecture:
Conjecture 1 The smallest coefficient in the expansion in Eq. (11) is cmin = minq cq =
c(1,1,1,..,0,0). Equation (13) then implies
cmin =
(
m+ n− 1
n
)−1
=
1
d
. (14)
We have used this conjecture to produce the plot in Fig. 3. If the number of modes is much
larger than the number of photons squared, m ≫ n2 ≫ 1, the probability that two or more
photons occupy a given mode is highly suppressed. In this limit, we have cmin = n!/m
2
(see Appendix D).
The other quantity we are interested in is
γ = max
φ
EU [|〈φ|U |ψ〉|
4]
(EU [|〈φ|U |ψ〉|2])
2 , (15)
where the maximum is over a generic n-photon vector φ, and ψ is a vector in the code book
Cmn . Again, because of symmetry, γ is independent of ψ. Note that γ quantifies how much
the transition probability |〈φ|U |ψ〉|2 changes when a random unitary is applied. In the
regime of m ≫ n2 ≫ 1, an analytical bound can be computed and we obtain γ ≤ 2(n+ 1).
This is discussed in Appendix D.
For generic values of n and m, we estimate γ numerically. To do that, we first expand
the generic state φ as
|φ〉 =
∑
q,t
αq,t|φq,t〉 , (16)
where q identifies a subspace with given photon occupancy pattern, and t labels the basis
vectors within. By symmetry, the following identities hold:
EU
[
〈φq,t|U |ψ〉〈ψ|U
†|φq′,t′〉
]
= δqq′δtt′EU
[
|〈φq,t|U |ψ〉|
2
]
, (17)
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(m,n) Photon occupancy pattern q cq n!/m
n
(6, 2) (1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0) 0.0471 0.0556
(2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) 0.0977
(10, 2) (1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) 0.0181 0.02
(2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) 0.0369
(20, 2) (1, 1, 0, 0, . . . ) 0.00476 0.005
(2, 0, 0, 0, . . . ) 0.00959
(10, 3) (1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) 0.00451 0.006
(1, 2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) 0.00914
(3, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) 0.0283
(20, 3) (1, 1, 1, 0, . . . ) 0.000648 0.00075
(1, 2, 0, 0, . . . ) 0.00131
(3, 0, 0, 0, . . . ) 0.00398
(30, 10) (1, 1, 1, 1, 0, . . . ) 1.56 × 10−9 6.14 × 10−9
(1, 9, 0, 0, 0, . . . ) 0.00068
(10, 0, 0, 0, . . . ) 0.0072
Table 1: The table shows numerical estimates of the coefficient cq for several number of photon (n)
and modes (m) and patterns of photon occupancy. The table also show the corresponding value of the
coefficient n!/mn, which is relevant in the regime where m ≫ n2 ≫ 1.
and
EU
[
〈φq,t|U |ψ〉〈ψ|U
†|φq′,t′〉〈φq′′,t′′ |U |ψ〉〈ψ|U
†|φq′′′,t′′′〉
]
=
δqq′δtt′δq′′q′′′δt′′t′′′ + δqq′′′δtt′′′δq′q′′δt′t′′
2δqq′′δtt′′
EU
[
|〈φq,t|U |ψ〉|
2|〈φq′′,t′′ |U |ψ〉|
2
]
. (18)
This implies
EU [|〈φ|U |ψ〉|
2] =
∑
q,t
|λq,t|
2
EU [|〈φq,t|U |ψ〉|
2] , (19)
and
EU [|〈φ|U |ψ〉|
4] =
∑
q,t
|λq,t|
4
EU
[
|〈φq,t|U |ψ〉|
4
]
+ 2
∑
q,t 6=q′,t′
|λq,t|
2|λq′,t′ |
2
EU
[
|〈φq,t|U |ψ〉|
2|〈φq′,t′ |U |ψ〉|
2
]
≤ 2
∑
q,t,q′,t′
|λq,t|
2|λq′,t′ |
2
EU
[
|〈φq,t|U |ψ〉|
2|〈φq′,t′ |U |ψ〉|
2
]
≤ 2
∑
q,t,q′,t′
|λq,t|
2|λq′,t′ |
2
√
EU [|〈φq,t|U |ψ〉|4]E
[
〈φq′,t′ |U |ψ〉|4
]
= 2


∑
q,t
|λq,t|
2
√
EU [|〈φq,t|U |ψ〉|4]


2
, (20)
where the second inequality is an application of Cauchy-Schwarz.
In conclusion we obtain the upper bound
γ ≤ 2 max
φ


∑
q,t |λq,t|
2
√
EU [|〈φq,t|U |ψ〉|4]
∑
q,t |λq,t|
2EU [|〈φq,t|U |ψ〉|2]


2
≤ 2 max
q,t
EU
[
|〈φq,t|U |ψ〉|
4
]
EU [|〈φq,t|U |ψ〉|2]
2 . (21)
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(m,n) Photon pattern 2γq 2(n+ 1)
(6, 2) (1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0) 3.770 6
(2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) 4.314
(10, 2) (1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) 4.256 6
(2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) 5.136
(20, 2) (1, 1, 0, 0, . . . ) 4.751 6
(2, 0, 0, 0, . . . ) 5.894
(40,2) (1, 1, 0, 0, . . . ) 4.593 6
(2, 0, 0, 0, . . . ) 5.882
(10, 3) (1, 1, 1, 0, . . . ) 4.562 8
(1, 2, 0, 0, . . . ) 5.366
(3, 0, 0, 0, . . . ) 6.968
(40,3) (1, 1, 1, 0, . . . ) 5.475 8
(1, 2, 0, 0, . . . ) 6.853
(3, 0, 0, 0, . . . ) 9.717
Table 2: The table shows numerically computed values of γq for different number of photons (n), modes
(m), and photon occupancy patterns. The upper bound γ ≤ 2(n + 1) is shown here for comparison,
but it holds only in the regime of m ≫ n2 ≫ 1.
Compared with the definition in Eq. (15), to compute this upper bound we only need to
consider the basis vectors φq,t. Furthermore, by symmetry, the quantities EU
[
|〈φq,t|U |ψ〉|
4
]
and EU
[
|〈φq,t|U |ψ〉|
2
]
are independent of t. The expression in Eq. (21) is therefore suitable
to be evaluated numerically. The penalty that we pay for this simplification is the multipli-
cation by a factor 2. Some examples are shown in Table 2. More numerical estimations of
γ are shown in Appendix D. Our numerical search suggests that the maximum in Eq. (21)
is achieved for q = (n, 0, 0, . . . , 0). Supported by these numerical results, we formulate the
following conjecture:
Conjecture 2 The maximum in Eq. (21) is obtained when all photons occupy the same
mode, i.e., for q = (n, 0, 0, . . . , 0). This yields
γ ≤ 2
EU
[
|〈φq|U |ψ〉|
4
]
EU [|〈φq|U |ψ〉|2]
2 , (22)
where
|φq〉 = |n, 0, 0, . . . , 0〉 . (23)
This conjecture is used to produce Fig. 3.
5 Results
Our main result is an estimate of the minimum key size Kǫ that guarantees that the
accessible information Iacc(X;B) is of order ǫ. This estimate is expressed in terms of the
parameters cmin and γ introduced in Section 4.
Proposition 1 Consider the QDL protocol described in Section 3, which encodes logM bits
of information using n photons over m modes. For any ǫ, ξ ∈ (0, 1), and for any K > Kǫ,
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there exist choices of K linear optics unitaries such that Iacc(X;B) < 2ǫ log
1
cmin
, where
Kǫ = max
{
γ
[
256
ǫ3
d
M
ln
(
20
ǫcmin
)
+
32
ǫ2
lnM
]
,
32
ǫ2
(ln 2d)2
Mcmin
}
(24)
and M = ξC. Recall that d =
(n+m−1
n
)
is the dimension of the Hilbert space with n photons
over m modes, and C =
(m
n
)
is the number of states with no more than one photon per
mode.
The parameters γ and cmin depend on the particular values of n and m. We identify
three regimes for n and m:
1. For n = 1, the group of linear optical passive unitaries spans all unitaries in the
subspace of n = 1 photon over m modes. The single-photon representation of the
group of LOP unitaries is the fundamental representation of U(m). We then obtain
γ = 2 and cmin = 1/m [4, 12].
2. In the regime where m ≫ n2 ≫ 1 (the no-collision regime), γ ≈ 2(n + 1) and
cmin ≈ n!/m
n (see Appendix D.
3. For generic values of n and m, to the best of our knowledge both γ and cmin need to
be calculated numerically. The estimation can be simplified if we assume Conjectures
1 and 2 introduced in Sec. 4.
We can write Eq. (24) as
logKǫ = max
{
log γ + log
d
M
+ f(ǫ, cmin,M) , log
(
1
Mcmin
)
+ g(ǫ, cmin, d)
}
, (25)
where the functions f and g scale as log (1/ǫ). For illustration, Fig. 2 shows logM and an
estimate of logKǫ as functions of n. To obtain the plot, we have chosen m = n
3 and used
the limiting values for the parameters γ = 2(n+ 1) and cmin = n!/m
n.
Note that, as ǫ is expected to be sufficiently small, this estimate for the secret key size
is useful only in the limit of asymptotically large Kǫ, i.e., when one encodes information
using asymptotically many modes and photons. This is certainly not the regime one is
willing to test in an experimental demonstration of QDL.
The QDL protocol outperforms the classical one-time pad when logM > logKǫ, for
some reasonably small value of ǫ. Some numerical examples are in Fig. 2, which show the
gap between logM and logKǫ increases with increasing number of modes and photons.
For example, for n = 20, m = 8000, ξ = 0.01, and ǫ = 10−10, we obtain logM ≃ 192 and
logKǫ ≃ 127 < 0.7 logM . This shows explicitly that we can achieve information theoretical
security with a private key shorter than the message if n and m are large enough.
Scaling up the communication protocol : in a practical communication scenario, not only
one signal, but a large number of signals are sent from Alice to Bob through a given
quantum communication channel. Consider a train of ν ≫ 1 channel uses, where Alice
encodes a classical variable X(ν) into tensor-product code words of the form
|ψx〉 = |ψx1〉 ⊗ |ψx2〉 ⊗ . . . |ψxν 〉 , (26)
where each component ψx1 is a state of n photons over m modes. Over ν channel
uses, the total number of code words is denoted as M (ν) = ξCn, and the code rate is
limν→∞
1
ν logM
(ν) = logC. Similarly, Alice applies local unitaries to these code words,
Uk = Uk1 ⊗ Uk2 · · · ⊗ Ukν , (27)
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Figure 2: The solid blue line shows the number of transmitted bits logM = log ξ
(
m
n
)
versus the photon
number n, for a fraction of the code space ξ = 0.01 and m = n3. The other lines shows the estimate of
the secret key consumption logK in Eq. (24)). This is obtained using γ = 2(n+1) and cmin = n!/m
n,
i.e., assuming the values in the limit of no-collision. The other parameters are: ǫ = 2−n
s
, s = 0.5 (red
dashed); s = 1 (purple dotted); ǫ = 10−10 (green dotted dashed). If we choose the security parameter
ǫ ∝ 2−n
s
, then Iacc → 0 as n → ∞. When the blue curve is higher than the other curves, the message
is longer than the key. In this case, QDL beats the classical one-time pad and allows to expand the
initial secret key of logKǫ bits into a longer key of logM bits.
for a total number of K(ν) allowed unitaries acting on ν channel uses. We denote as Bν
the outputs of ν channel uses received by Bob. The security condition on the mutual
information then reads Iacc(X
ν ;Bν) = O(ǫ logM (ν)).
Corollary 1 For any ǫ, ξ ∈ (0, 1), and for any K(ν) > Kǫ, there exist choices of K
(ν) local
unitaries upon ν channel uses such that Iacc(X
ν ;Bν) ≤ 2ǫ log 1cnmin
, where
Kǫ = max
{
γν
[
512
ǫ3
dν
M (ν)
ln
(
20
ǫcνmin
)
+
64
ǫ2
lnM (ν)
]
,
32
ǫ2
(ln 2dν)2
M (ν)cνmin
}
. (28)
The minimum secret key consumption rate then reads
k := lim
ν→∞
1
ν
logKǫ = max
{
log γ + log
d
C
, log
1
Ccmin
}
. (29)
Corollary 1 allows us to estimate the net secret key rate as the difference between the
code rate and the secret key consumption rate,
rQDL = logC − k , (30)
where conjecture 1 implies k = log γ + log dC . If rQDL > 0, then the QDL is successful in
beating the classical one-time pad and generates a secret key at a rate of logC bits per
channel use larger than the key consumption rate of k bits.
We can compare these results with the classical one-time pad encryption as well as
previously known QDL protocols. We consider the three parameters that characterise
symmetric key encryption: the length logK of the initial secret key, the length logM of
the message, and the security parameter ǫ. Classical one-time pad requires logK = logM
for perfect encryption (ǫ = 0). Therefore, the comparison with QDL makes sense in the
regime where ǫ can be made arbitrary small. In this regime, we can then say that a QDL
protocol beats the classical one-time pad if K ≪ M .
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The QDL protocol that has up to now the largest gap between K and M was proposed
by Fawzi et al. in Ref. [7]. This protocol requires an initial key of constant size logK ∼
log 1/ǫ for any sufficiently large M . This is obtained by using random unitaries in the
M -dimensional Hilbert space, and therefore requires a universal quantum computer acting
on a large Hilbert space.
Proposition 1 shows that there exist QDL protocols with logK ∼ O(log 1/ǫ)+log (d/M) =
O(log 1/ǫ) + log (d/C) + log (1/ξ). Comparing with Ref. [7], the length of the secret key
has an overhead proportional to
log
d
M
= log
(m+ n+ 1)!(m− n)!
m!(m+ 1)!
. (31)
The advantage with respect to Ref. [7] is that the encryption only requires linear optical
passive unitaries. For m and n large, using the Stirling approximation we obtain
log
d
M
∼ n log
(
1 +
2n
m− n
)
+m log
(
1 −
n2
m2
)
, (32)
which becomes negligibly small in the limit of diluted photons, m ≫ n2 ≫ 1.
Corollary 1 shows the existence of QDL protocols for ν channel uses where a secret
key of logK ∼ ν (log γ + log d/C) allows us to encrypt logM ∼ ν logC, where ǫ → 0
in the limit that ν → ∞, and the constant γ depends on the particular choice of the
parameters n and m. Note that in these protocols the secret key length logK is not
constant, but scales as the message length logM . Although they have the same scaling,
we can still have logM > logK in some regime. Despite being less efficient in terms of key
use, the advantage of these protocols is that they only need linear optics passive unitaries
acting on a small number of photons and modes, i.e., n and m can be chosen finite and
small. For example, for n = 10 photons over m = 30 modes, we obtain logM ≃ 25
and log (d/M) ≃ 4.4 < 15 logM . From table 4 we also obtain the numerical estimates
log γ < log (111.5) ≃ 6.8 < 13 logM . Putting k = limν→∞
1
ν logK, we obtain the following
estimate for the asymptotic rate of secret key consumption,
k = log γ + log
d
M
≃ 4.4 + 6.8 = 11.2 <
1
2
logM . (33)
This shows explicitly that less than logM bits of secret key are used to encrypt a message
of logM bits. Therefore, the net key generation rate in this case is
rQDL = logM − k >
1
2
logM . (34)
In Section 8 we consider the effect of photon loss in terms of the net rate per mode, rQDL/m.
6 Proof of Proposition 1
We prove the proposition using a random-coding argument. We show that a random choice
of the code and of the set of scrambling unitaries leads, with high probability, to a QDL
protocol that satisfies the security property.
The code book C̄mn of cardinality M is randomly chosen by sampling from the code
book Cmn of cardinality C. We put M = ξC. For ξ ≪ 1, we expect that the M code words
are all distinct up to terms of second order in ξ. Therefore the M code words encode
logM −O(log (1/ξ)) bits of information.
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The sender Alice first prepares a state |ψx〉, then applies a linear optics unitary Uk.
The unitary is chosen among a pool of K elements according to a secret key of logK bits.
We choose the pool of unitaries by drawing K unitaries i.i.d. according to the uniform
Haar measure on the group ULO(m) of linear optics unitary transformations on m modes.
If the receiver does not know the secret key, the state is described by the density operator
ρxB =
1
K
K
∑
k=1
Uk|ψx〉〈ψx|U
†
k . (35)
Given the classical-quantum state
ρXB =
1
M
M
∑
x=1
|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxB , (36)
Bob attempts to extract information from this state by applying a measurement MB→Y .
Such a measurement is characterised by the POVM elements {αy|φy〉〈φy|}y, where φy’s
are unit vectors and αy > 0 such that
∑
y αy|φy〉〈φy| = I, with I the identity operator.
Without loss of generality we can consider rank-one POVM only [2]. The output of this
measurement is a random variable Y with probability density
pY (y) = αy
〈
φy
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
M
∑
x=1
1
M
ρxB
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
φy
〉
, (37)
and conditional probability
pY |X=x(y) = αy〈φy|ρ
x
B|φy〉 . (38)
The accessible information is the maximum mutual information between X and Y :
Iacc(X;B) = sup
ME→Y
I(X;Y ) , (39)
where
I(X;Y ) = H(X) +H(Y ) −H(XY ) = H(Y ) −H(Y |X)
= −
∑
y
pY (y) log pY (y) +
M
∑
x=1
1
M
∑
y
pY |X=x(y) log [pY |X=x(y)]
= −
∑
y
αy
〈
φy
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
M
∑
x=1
1
M
ρxB
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
φy
〉
log
(
αy〈φy|
M
∑
x=1
1
M
ρxB|φy〉
)
+
M
∑
x=1
1
M
∑
y
αy〈φy|ρ
x
B|φy〉 log [αy〈φy|ρ
x
B|φy〉] . (40)
This yields
I(X;Y ) =
∑
y
αy
{
−
〈
φy
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
1
M
M
∑
x=1
ρxB
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
φy
〉
log
〈
φy
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
1
M
M
∑
x=1
ρxB
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
φy
〉
+
1
M
M
∑
x=1
〈φy|ρ
x
B|φy〉 log 〈φy|ρ
x
B|φy〉
}
. (41)
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Note that the accessible information is written as the difference of two entropy-like
quantities. The rationale of the proof is to show that for K large enough, and for ran-
dom choices of the unitaries and of the code words, both terms in the curly brackets are
arbitrarily close to
−〈φy|ρ̄B|φy〉 log 〈φy|ρ̄B|φy〉 (42)
for all vectors φy, where ρ̄B is as in Eq. (10). This in turn implies that the accessible
information can be made arbitrarily small. To show this we exploit the phenomenon of
concentration towards the average of the sum of i.i.d. random variables. This concentration
is quantified by concentration inequalities.
We now proceed along two parallel directions.
First, we apply the matrix Chernoff bound [30] to show that 1M
∑M
x=1 ρ
x
B is close to ρ̄B.
In particular the matrix Chernoff bound implies that the inequality
1
M
M
∑
x=1
ρxB ≤ (1 + ǫ)ρ̄B (43)
holds true up to a failure probability
p1 ≤ exp

ln (2d) −
ǫ
4
√
MKcmin
2

 . (44)
This in turn implies
−
〈
φ
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
1
M
M
∑
x=1
ρxB
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
φ
〉
log
〈
φ
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
1
M
M
∑
x=1
ρxB
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
φ
〉
≤ −(1 + ǫ)〈φ|ρ̄B|φ〉 log 〈φ|ρ̄B|φ〉 (45)
uniformly for all φ. The details are presented in Appendix A below.
Second, we apply a tail bound from A. Maurer [31] to show that
〈φ|ρxB|φ〉 ≥ (1 − ǫ)〈φ|ρ̄B|φ〉 , (46)
up to a failure probability
p2 ≤ exp
[
2d ln
(
20
ǫcmin
)
+
ǫM
4
lnM −
KMǫ3
128γ
]
. (47)
The above applies uniformly to all unit vectors φ and for almost all values of x. This
implies that
〈φ|ρxB|φ〉 log 〈φ|ρ
x
B|φ〉 ≤ (1 − ǫ)〈φ|ρ̄B|φ〉 log (1 − ǫ)〈φ|ρ̄B|φ〉 . (48)
In conclusion, we obtain that, up to a probability smaller than p2,
1
M
M
∑
x=1
〈φ|ρxB|φ〉 log 〈φ|ρ
x
B|φ〉 ≤ (1 − ǫ)〈φ|ρ̄B|φ〉 log 〈φ|ρ̄B|φ〉 . (49)
The details are presented in Appendix B.
Putting the above results in Eq. (45) and (49) into Eq. (41) we finally obtain
I(X;Y ) ≤ −2ǫ
∑
y
αy〈φy|ρ̄B|φy〉 log 〈φy|ρ̄B|φy〉 . (50)
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Recall that pY (y) = αy〈φy|ρ̄B|φy〉 is a probability distribution. Therefore, as the average
is always smaller that the maximum, we obtain
I(X;Y ) ≤ −2ǫmin
φ
log 〈φ|ρ̄B|φ〉 = 2ǫ log
1
cmin
, (51)
where cmin := minφ〈φ|ρ̄B|φ〉 can be computed as shown in Section 4.
The above bound on the accessible information is not deterministic, but the probability
p1 +p2 that it fails can be made arbitrary small provided K is large enough (see Appendix
C for details). This probability is bounded away from 1 if
K >
32
ǫ2
(ln 2d)2
Mcmin
, (52)
and
K > 128γ
[
2
ǫ3
d
M
ln
(
20
ǫcmin
)
+
1
4ǫ2
lnM
]
. (53)
The size of K critically depends on the factor γ, which determines the convergence rate
of the Maurer tail bound. How to estimate this coefficient is the subject of Appendix D.
7 Proof of Corollary 1
Consider a train of ν ≫ 1 channel uses. Alice encodes information using M (ν) code words
of the form |ψx〉 = |ψx1〉⊗|ψx2〉⊗ . . . |ψxν 〉, where each component ψx1 is chosen randomly
and independently from the code book Cmn , which has cardinality C. Each ν-fold code
word is uniquely identified by the multi-index x = x1, x2, . . . , xν . We put M
(ν) = ξCν ,
where ξ ≪ 1 is a small positive constant.
First Alice encodes information across ν signal uses using the code words ψx, then she
applies local unitaries Uk = Uk1 ⊗ Uk2 · · · ⊗ Ukν to scramble them. The set of possible
unitaries is made of K(ν) elements. These unitaries are chosen by sampling identically
and independently from the Haar measure on the unitary group ULO(m) of linear optical
passive unitary transformations on m modes. Note that, whereas ν is arbitrary large, the
number of modes m in each signal transmission will be kept constant and relatively small.
Also, the number of photons per channel use is fixed and equal to n.
The accessible information is then formally equivalent to the one in Eq. (41):
I(Xν ;Y ) =
∑
y
αy



−
〈
φy
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
1
M (ν)
M(ν)
∑
x=1
ρxB
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
φy
〉
log
〈
φy
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
1
M (ν)
M(ν)
∑
x=1
ρxB
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
φy
〉
+
1
M (ν)
M(ν)
∑
x=1
〈φy|ρ
x
B|φy〉 log 〈φy|ρ
x
B|φy〉



, (54)
where for each x = x1, x2, . . . , xν ,
ρxB =
K(ν)
∑
k=1
Uk|ψx〉〈ψx|U
†
k (55)
=
K(ν)
∑
k1,...,kν=1
(Uk1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Ukν ) (|ψx1〉〈ψx1 | ⊗ · · · ⊗ |ψxν 〉〈ψxν |)
(
U †k1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ U
†
kν
)
(56)
=
ν
⊗
i=1
K(ν)
∑
ki=1
Uki |ψxi〉〈ψxi |U
†
ki
. (57)
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This in particular implies
ρ̄
(ν)
B := EU [Uk|ψx〉〈ψx|U
†
k] = ρ̄
⊗ν
B , (58)
and therefore
c
(ν)
min := min
φ
〈φ|ρ̄
(ν)
B |φ〉 = minφ
〈φ|ρ̄⊗νB |φ〉 = c
ν
min (59)
γ(ν) := max
φ
EU [|〈φ|Uk|ψx〉|
4]
EU [|〈φ|Uk|ψx〉|2]2
. (60)
To bound γ(ν) we can first decompose a generic vector φ as |φ〉 =
∑
q,t αq,t|φq,t〉, where
|φq,t〉 = |φq1,t1〉 ⊗ |φq2,t2〉 ⊗ · · · |φqν ,tν 〉 define a basis of product vectors. We can then
apply the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, as shown in Section 4, to obtain the upper bound
γ(ν) ≤ 2γν .
In conclusion, we can straightforwardly repeat the proof of Section 6 with these new
parameters. This yields that, for any arbitrarily small ǫ, the bound
I(Xν ;Y ) ≤ 2ǫ log
1
cνmin
, (61)
holds with non-zero probability provided that (recall that M (ν) = ξCν)
K > max
{
γν
[
512
ǫ3
dν
M (ν)
ln
(
20
ǫcνmin
)
+
64
ǫ2
lnM (ν)
]
,
32
ǫ2
(ln 2dν)2
M (ν)cνmin
}
. (62)
Finally, in the limit of ν ≫ 1, and since limν→∞
1
ν logM
(ν) = logC, we obtain
lim
ν→∞
1
ν
logKǫ ≥ max
{
log γ + log
d
C
, log
1
Ccmin
}
. (63)
8 Noisy channels
A practical communication protocol needs to account for loss and noise in the communica-
tion channel. This requires us to introduce error correction in the classical post-processing.
We address this issue here and show that the structure of our proof encompasses a large
class of error correcting protocols.
In the case of a noisy and lossy channel, Alice and Bob can still use the channel by
employing error correction. Error correction comes with an overhead that reduces the
maximum communication rate from logM (the maximum amount of information that can
be conveyed through a noiseless channel) to I(X;Y |K) ≤ logM , where I(X;Y |K) is the
mutual information given that both Alice and Bob know the secret key K.
The amount of loss and noise in the communication channel can be experimentally
determined with the standard tools of parameter estimation, a routine commonly employed
in quantum key distribution. This in turn allows Alice and Bob to quantify I(X;Y |K).
In principle, error correction allows Alice and Bob to achieve a communication rate
arbitrarily close to I(X;Y |K). In practice, however, we can only partially achieve this goal.
To model this fact, one usually introduce the error correction efficiency factor β ∈ (0, 1).
Putting this together with Corollary 1, we obtain our estimate for the net rate of the
protocol:
rQDL = βI(X;Y |K) − max
{
log γ + log
d
C
, log
1
Ccmin
}
, (64)
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Figure 3: The rate-loss trade-off for our protocol with m = 10, 20, 30, and 40. The rates represent the
excess number of transmitted (secure) bits per optical mode ( 1
m
× Eq. (56)) over the classical one-time
pad, in the presence of loss. A positive rate expresses the fact that the QDL protocol allows us to
generate more secret bits than it consumes, hence beating the classical one-time pad encryption. The
estimates of the parameters γ and cmin are obtained by assuming Conjectures 1 and 2. We see that the
information density per mode increases as m increases. We have chosen n to maximise the rate. The
optimal value of n depends on η, and n ≈ m/3 for η ≈ 1. For moderate losses, the optimal n decreases.
This suggests that QDL may be observed with high loss by increasing the number of modes. These
values for the number of photons and modes are similar to those of a recent experimental demonstration
of Boson Sampling [32].
where a positive net rate expresses the fact that the QDL protocol allows us to expand the
initial secret key into a longer one.
As an example, consider the case where Alice and Bob communicate through a lossy
optical channel. The efficiency factor η ∈ (0, 1) represents the probability that a photon
sent by Alice is detected by Bob, including both channel losses and detector efficiency.
The mutual information I(X;Y |K) between Alice and Bob can be computed explicitly
(see Appendix E for detail). We obtain :
I(X;Y |K) = −
n
∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
ηk(1 − η)n−k log
(m−k
n−k
)
(m
n
) (65)
= log
(
m
n
)
−
n
∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
ηk(1 − η)n−k log
(
m− k
n− k
)
. (66)
Fig. 3 shows the quantity rQDL/m, i.e., the number of bits per mode, for β = 1, for
a pure loss channel with transmissivity η. The plot is obtained assuming Conjectures 1
and 2. This shows that QDL can be demonstrated experimentally with loss and inefficient
detectors. In particular, higher loss can be tolerated by increasing the number of optical
modes. Note that the values for the number of photons and modes used to obtain this
figure have been achieved experimentally in Ref. [32].
9 Conclusions
The phenomenon of Quantum Data Locking (QDL) represents one of the most remarkable
separations between classical and quantum information theory. In classical information
theory, information-theoretic encryption of a string of N bits can be only made by exploit-
ing a secret key of at least N bits. This is realised, for example, by using a one-time pad.
By contrast, QDL shows that, if information is encoded into a quantum system of matter
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or light, it is possible to encrypt N bits of information with a secret key of k ≪ N bits.
QDL is a manifestation of the uncertainty principle in quantum information theory [8, 9].
Initial works on QDL have focused on abstract protocols defined in a Hilbert space
of asymptotically large dimensions. More recent works have extended QDL to system of
relatively small dimensions that are transmitted through many uses of a communication
channel. This approach allowed to incorporate error correction and led to one of the first
experimental demonstrations of QDL in an optical setup [13].
Inspired by Boson Sampling [33, 34], in this work we have further extended QDL to a
setup where information is encoded using multiple photons scattered across many modes,
and processed using linear passive optics. The extension of QDL to multiphoton states is
technically challenging due to role played by higher-order representations of the unitary
group.
Our protocols for multiphoton QDL has the potential to data-lock more bits per optical
mode, hence can achieve a higher information density. Experimental realisations of our
protocols are challenging but feasible with state-of-the-art technology. This is suggested
by recent results in photon generation and advances in integrated linear optics, e.g., Ref.
[32] reported interference of 20 photons across 60 modes.
Several works have attempted to apply the physical insights of Boson Sampling in a
quantum information framework beyond its defining problem. In this paper, we provide
a protocol for quantum cryptography based on the physics of Boson Sampling. We have
presented an information-theoretic proof that a linear-optical interferometer, fed with mul-
tiple photons, is useful for quantum cryptography. The security of our protocol does not
rely on the classical computational complexity of Boson Sampling. Therefore it holds for
any number of modes m and photon number n. The security proof is based on QDL and
random coding techniques. We have shown that our protocol remains secure when we use
classical error correction to protect the channel against photon loss and other errors. It is
therefore a scalable and efficient protocol for quantum cryptography.
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A Matrix Chernoff bounds
The matrix Chernoff bound states the following (this formulation can be obtained directly
from Theorem 19 of Ref. [30]):
Theorem 1 Let {Xt}t=1,...,T be T i.i.d. d-dimensional Hermitian-matrix-valued random
variables, with Xt ∼ X, 0 ≤ X ≤ R, and cmin ≤ E[X] ≤ cmax. Then, for δ ≥ 0:
Pr
{
1
T
T
∑
t=1
Xt 6≤ (1 + δ)E[X]
}
≤ d exp
{
−TD
[
(1 + δ)
cmin
R
∥
∥
∥
∥
cmin
R
]}
, (67)
where Pr{x} denotes the probability that the proposition x is true, and D[u‖v] = u ln (u/v)−
(1 − u) ln [(1 − u)/(1 − v)].
Note that for δ > 1 we have
D
[
(1 + δ)
cmin
R
∥
∥
∥
∥
cmin
R
]
≥
δ
4
cmin
R
, (68)
and for δ < 1
D
[
(1 + δ)
cmin
R
∥
∥
∥
∥
cmin
R
]
≥
δ2
4
cmin
R
. (69)
First consider the collection of M code words ψx. We apply the Chernoff bound to the
M independent random variables Xx = |ψx〉〈ψx|. Note that these operators are defined in
a C-dimensional Hilbert space. For τ > 1 we then have
Pr
{
1
M
M
∑
x=1
|ψx〉〈ψx| 6≤
1 + τ
C
}
≤ C exp
(
−
Mτ
4C
)
. (70)
Consider now the collection of K random variables Xk =
1
M
∑
x Uk|ψx〉〈ψx|U
†
k . We
assume that they are bounded by R = 1+τC . We apply again the Chernoff bound:
Pr
{
1
K
K
∑
k=1
1
M
∑
x
Uk|ψx〉〈ψx|U
†
k 6≤ (1 + ǫ)E[X]
}
≤ d exp
(
−
CKǫ2cmin
4(1 + τ)
)
. (71)
Thus the total probability reads
p1 ≤ C exp
(
−
Mτ
4C
)
+ d exp
(
−
CKǫ2cmin
4(1 + τ)
)
(72)
≤ C exp
(
−
Mτ
4C
)
+ d exp
(
−
CKǫ2cmin
8τ
)
. (73)
Putting τ = Cǫ
√
Kcmin
2M we obtain
p1 ≤ (C + d) exp

−
ǫ
4
√
MKcmin
2

 ≤ 2d exp

−
ǫ
4
√
MKcmin
2

 . (74)
In conclusion we have obtained that, up to a probability smaller than p1,
1
KM
K
∑
k=1
M
∑
x=1
Uk|x〉〈x|U
†
k =
1
M
M
∑
x=1
ρxB ≤ (1 + ǫ)ρ̄B . (75)
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B The Maurer tail bound
We also need to apply the following concentration inequality due to A. Maurer [31]:
Theorem 2 Let {Xk}k=1,...,K be K i.i.d. non-negative real-valued random variables, with
Xk ∼ X and finite first and second moments, E[X],E[X
2] < ∞. Then, for any τ > 0 we
have that
Pr
{
1
K
K
∑
k=1
Xk < (1 − τ)E[X]
}
≤ exp
(
−
Kτ2E[X]2
2E[X2]
)
. (76)
For any given x and φ, we apply this bound to the random variables
Xk ≡ |〈φ|Uk|ψx〉|
2 . (77)
Note that (see Section 4)
1
K
K
∑
k=1
Xk = 〈φ|ρ
x
B|φ〉 , (78)
and
E[X] = 〈φ|ρ̄B|φ〉 . (79)
The application of the Maurer tail bound then yields
Pr {〈φ|ρxB|φ〉 < (1 − τ)〈φ|ρ̄B|φ〉} ≤ exp
(
−
Kτ2
2γ
)
, (80)
where
γ = max
φ
EU [X
2]
EU [X]2
= max
φ
EU [|〈φ|U |ψx〉|
4]
〈φ|ρ̄B|φ〉2
. (81)
Note that, by symmetry, γ is independent of ψx. The calculation of γ is presented in
Appendix D.
B.1 Extending to almost all code words
The probability bound in Eq. (80) is about one given value of x. Here we extend it to ℓ
distinct values x1, x2, . . . , xℓ:
Pr {∀x = x1, x2, . . . xℓ, 〈φ|ρ
x
B|φ〉 < (1 − τ)〈φ|ρ̄B|φ〉} ≤ exp
(
−
ℓKτ2
2γ
)
, (82)
where we have used the fact that for different values of x the variables are statistically
independent (recall that the code words are chosen randomly and independently). Second,
we extend to all possible choices of ℓ code words. This amount to a total of
(M
ℓ
)
events.
Applying the union bound we obtain
Pr {∃x1, x2, . . . xℓ, | ∀x = x1, x2, . . . xℓ, 〈φ|ρ
x
B|φ〉 < (1 − τ)〈φ|ρ̄B|φ〉} ≤
(
M
ℓ
)
exp
(
−
ℓKτ2
2γ
)
.
(83)
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This implies that, up to a probability smaller than
(M
ℓ
)
exp
(
− ℓKτ
2
2γ
)
, 〈φ|ρxB|φ〉 ≥ (1 −
τ)〈φ|ρ̄B|φ〉 for at least M − ℓ values of x. This in turn yields
1
M
M
∑
x=1
〈φ|ρxB|φ〉 log 〈φ|ρ
x
B|φ〉 ≤
M − ℓ
M
(1 − τ)〈φ|ρ̄B|φ〉 log [(1 − τ)〈φ|ρ̄B|φ〉] . (84)
Putting ℓ = τM :
1
M
M
∑
x=1
〈φ|ρxB|φ〉 log 〈φ|ρ
x
B|φ〉 ≤ (1 − τ)
2〈φ|ρ̄B|φ〉 log [(1 − τ)〈φ|ρ̄B|φ〉] (85)
≤ (1 − τ)2〈φ|ρ̄B|φ〉 log 〈φ|ρ̄B|φ〉 (86)
= (1 − 2τ)〈φ|ρ̄B|φ〉 log 〈φ|ρ̄B|φ〉 +O(τ
2) . (87)
B.2 Extending to all vectors φ
The final step is to extend the result to all unit vectors. This can be done by exploiting
the notion of δ-net. A δ-net is a discrete and finite set of vectors {φi} on the unit sphere
such that for any unit vector φ there exists an element in the δ-net such that
‖φ− φi‖1 ≤ δ . (88)
It is known that there exist δ-nets with no more than (5/δ)2d elements [6], where d is the
Hilbert space dimension. We put δ = τcmin, therefore the size of the net is (5/τ/cmin)
2d.
Applying the union bound on Eq. (83) we then obtain
Pr {∀φ,∃x1, x2, . . . xℓ, | ∀x = x1, x2, . . . xℓ, 〈φ|ρ
x
B|φ〉 < (1 − 2τ)〈φ|ρ̄B|φ〉}
≤
(
5
τcmin
)2d
(
M
ℓ
)
exp
(
−
ℓKτ2
2γ
)
. (89)
To conclude, we put ǫ = 4τ and obtain that, uniformly in φ,
1
M
M
∑
x=1
〈φ|ρxB|φ〉 log 〈φ|ρ
x
B|φ〉 ≤ (1 − ǫ)〈φ|ρ̄B|φ〉 log 〈φ|ρ̄B|φ〉 +O(ǫ
2) . (90)
The probability that this bound is violated is smaller than (recall that ℓ = τM = ǫM/4)
p2 =
(
5
τcmin
)2d
(
M
ℓ
)
exp
(
−
ℓKτ2
2γ
)
(91)
=
(
20
ǫcmin
)2d
(
M
ǫM/4
)
exp
(
−
KMǫ3
128γ
)
(92)
≤
(
20
ǫcmin
)2d
M ǫM/4 exp
(
−
KMǫ3
128γ
)
. (93)
C Probability of failure
The above concentration inequalities allow us to prove that the protocol is secure up a
to certain probability. The bad event that the protocol is not secure occurs when either
Eq. (45) or (49) is violated. The probability of the bad event is then smaller the sum
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of the corresponding probabilities, which are given in Eq. (74) and (93) respectively. We
therefore have
Pfail ≤ p1 + p2 ≤ 2d exp

−
ǫ
4
√
MKcmin
2

+
(
20
ǫcmin
)2d
M ǫM/4 exp
(
−
KMǫ3
128γ
)
(94)
= exp

log 2d−
ǫ
4
√
MKcmin
2

+ exp
[
2d log
(
20
ǫcmin
)
+
ǫM
4
logM −
KMǫ3
128γ
]
.
(95)
This probability is bounded away from 1 if
K >
32
ǫ2
1
Mcmin
(log 2d)2 , (96)
and
K > 128γ
[
2
ǫ3
d
M
log
(
20
ǫcmin
)
+
1
4ǫ2
logM
]
. (97)
D Estimating the factor γ
The goal of this Appendix is to estimate the factor γ that determines the secret key
consumption rate. The objective is therefore to evaluate the first and second moments of
the random variable
X = |〈φ|U |ψj〉|
2 , (98)
where φ restricted to be a vector in the single-occupancy subspace H1, which is our code
space. A generic state can be written as
|φ〉 =
∑
q,t
αq,t|φq,t〉 . (99)
We can apply the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality as shown in Section 4. This yields (see
Eq. (21)):
γ ≤ 2 max
q
EU [|〈φq,t|U |ψ〉|
4]
EU [|〈φq,t|U |ψ〉|2]2
. (100)
By symmetry, the quantities
γq :=
EU [|〈φq,t|U |ψ〉|
4]
EU [|〈φq,t|U |ψ〉|2]2
(101)
do depend on q but not on the particular vector φq in the subspace Hq, nor on the code
word ψ. Therefore for each q, γq can be computed numerically and in turn obtain an
estimate for the upper bound on the speed of convergence
γ ≤ 2 max
q
γq . (102)
Following the notation from Ref. [35], let Λ[k1, ..., km|l1, ...lm] be the m × m matrix
whose matrix elements are those of the original matrix Λ with row indices k1, ..., km, and
column indices l1, ...lm.
Λ[k1, k2, k3|l1, l2, l3] =



Λk1l1 Λk1l2 Λk1l3
Λk2l1 Λk2l2 Λk2l3
Λk3l1 Λk3l2 Λk3l3



(103)
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The object Λ[1i1, 2i2, ..|1j1, 2j2...] denotes a matrix whose entries are taken from the
matrix Λ, and whose row index l occurs il times, and whose column index k occurs jk
times. For example
Λ[11, 21, 31|10, 22, 31] =



Λ12 Λ12 Λ13
Λ22 Λ22 Λ23
Λ32 Λ32 Λ33



, (104)
〈i1, i2, ...im|Λ|j1, j2, ...jm〉 =
(
∏
l
il
)−1/2(
∏
k
jk
)−1/2
PermΛ[1i1 , 2i2 ..., N iM |1j1 , 2j2 , ..., N jM ] .
(105)
Using Eq. (105), we can calculate Eq. (100) for a particular photon occupancy pattern.
We numerically compute γq for different photon patterns for n between 2 and 8, exam-
ples are given in Table 2 and 3. Note that the number of configurations to search over grows
exponentially with n, and thus the search becomes infeasible with high n. The calculations
were performed in Python by computing the permanents of n×n submatrices of the m×m
unitaries generated from the Haar measure. The expectation value is taken by averaging
over ∼ 106 runs. We observe that the highest value of γq is achieved when all the photons
populate only one mode. To make the calculation feasible, we conjecture (Conjecture 2)
that this is also true for higher n; in this case, the computation can be performed much
more efficiently because the submatrices have repeated rows. This conjecture has been
used to produce the plots in Fig. 3. We repeat the calculation for n = 9 to 13, where the
results are shown in Table 4.
We now consider the regime of m ≫ n2 in which we can neglect photon bunching.
Therefore, we compute the first and second moments of the random variable
X ′ = |〈ψj′ |U |ψj〉|
2 . (106)
This is a little less general than (98) because ψj′ is not a generic vector in H
m
n . In fact ψj
and ψj′ identify two sets of modes, with labels (i1, i2, . . . in) and (i
′
1, i
′
2, . . . i
′
n), respectively.
This corresponds to photon-counting on the modes, which as we know, maps onto n × n
sub-matrix A(jj
′) of the unitary matrix U :
A
(jj′)
hk := Uihi′k . (107)
The random variable X ′ is the modulus square of the permanent of A(jj
′):
X ′ = |〈ψj′ |U |ψj〉|
2 =
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∑
π
n
∏
h=1
A
(jj′)
hπ(h)
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
2
, (108)
where the sum is over all the permutations π.
To further explore the statistical properties of the permanent, it is useful to recall that
a given entry of a random m×m unitary is itself distributed approximately as an complex
Gaussian variable with zero mean and variance 1/m. If instead we consider a submatrix
of size n × n the entries are with good approximation independent Gaussian variables as
long as n ≪ m [33]. This means that the entries A
(jj′)
hk are approximately distributed as
n2 i.i.d. complex Gaussian variables with zero mean and variance 1/m. Using this fact we
can compute the first and second moments of X ′.
X ′ =


∑
τ
n
∏
j=1
a∗jτ(j)

×
(
∑
σ
n
∏
i=1
aiσ(i)
)
=
∑
σ,τ
n
∏
i,j=1
a∗jτ(j)aiσ(i) =
n!
mn
, (109)
Accepted in Quantum 2021-04-19, click title to verify. Published under CC-BY 4.0. 26
since the non-zero terms are given by i = j, τ = σ.
From Lemma 56 of Ref. [33], the fourth moment of the permanent can be computed as
EU [X
′2] = EU [Perm[A]
2Perm[A∗]2] =
n!(n+ 1)!
m2n
. (110)
In conclusion, we have obtained
EU [X
′2]
EU [X ′]2
= n+ 1 . (111)
From which it follows,
γ ≤ 2(n+ 1) . (112)
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(m,n) Photon pattern 2γq
(20,4) (1, 1, 1, 1, 0, . . . ) 5.44
(1, 3, 0, . . . ) 8.91
(1, 1, 2, 0, . . . ) 6.60
(2, 2, 0, . . . ) 8.38
(4, 0, . . . ) 13.31
(20,5) (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, . . . ) 5.45
(1, 1, 3, 0, . . . ) 8.44
(1, 4, 0, . . . ) 12.13
(1, 2, 2, 0, . . . ) 7.80
(2, 3, 0, . . . ) 10.50
(1, 1, 1, 2, 0, . . . ) 6.50
(5, 0, . . . ) 16.93
(20,6) (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, . . . ) 5.34
(1, 1, 2, 2, 0, . . . ) 7.26
(3, 3, 0, . . . ) 12.86
(2, 2, 2, 0, . . . ) 8.72
(1, 1, 1, 3, 0, . . . ) 7.77
(1, 5, 0, . . . ) 15.89
(1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 0, . . . ) 6.16
(2, 4, 0, . . . ) 13.42
(1, 1, 4, 0, . . . ) 10.50
(1, 2, 3, 0, . . . ) 9.50
(6, 0, . . . ) 26.34
(20,8) (1, 1, 6, 0, . . . ) 15.81
(1, 1, 1, 2, 3, 0, . . . ) 7.30
(4, 4, 0, . . . ) 18.04
(2, 2, 4, 0, . . . ) 11.11
(1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 0, . . . ) 5.98
(2, 2, 2, 2, 0, . . . ) 7.95
(2, 3, 3, 0, . . . ) 10.91
(1, 1, 1, 5, 0, . . . ) 11.03
(2, 6, 0, . . . ) 19.18
(1, 1, 3, 3, 0, . . . ) 9.09
(1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, . . . ) 4.92
(1, 7, 0, . . . ) 24.34
(8, 0, . . . ) 34.86
(m,n) Photon pattern 2γq
(30,4) (1, 1, 1, 1, 0, . . . ) 5.92
(1, 3, 0, . . . ) 9.97
(1, 1, 2, 0, . . . ) 7.28
(2, 2, 0, . . . ) 9.47
(4, 0, . . . ) 15.07
(30,5) (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, . . . ) 6.12
(1, 1, 3, 0, . . . ) 10.10
(1, 4, 0, . . . ) 14.63
(1, 2, 2, 0, . . . ) 9.30
(2, 3, 0, . . . ) 12.88
(1, 1, 1, 2, 0, . . . ) 7.44
(5, 0, . . . ) 19.12
(30,6) (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, . . . ) 6.11
(1, 1, 2, 2, 0, . . . ) 9.03
(3, 3, 0, . . . ) 16.74
(2, 2, 2, 0, . . . ) 11.19
(1, 5, 0, . . . ) 20.82
(1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 0, . . . ) 7.29
(2, 4, 0, . . . ) 17.44
(1, 1, 4, 0, . . . ) 13.98
(1, 1, 1, 3, 0, . . . ) 9.72
(1, 2, 3, 0, . . . ) 11.99
(6, 0, . . . ) 33.20
(30,8) (1, 1, 6, 0, . . . ) 23.70
(1, 1, 1, 2, 3, 0, . . . ) 9.63
(4, 4, 0, . . . ) 27.56
(2, 2, 4, 0, . . . ) 17.58
(1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 0, . . . ) 7.63
(2, 2, 2, 2, 0, . . . ) 10.10
(2, 3, 3, 0, . . . ) 17.84
(1, 1, 1, 5, 0, . . . ) 15.70
(2, 6, 0, . . . ) 35.89
(1, 1, 3, 3, 0, . . . ) 12.80
(1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, . . . ) 5.82
(1, 7, 0, . . . ) 34.43
(8, 0, . . . ) 61.69
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(m,n) Photon pattern 2γq
(40,4) (1, 1, 1, 1, 0, . . . ) 6.09
(1, 3, 0, . . . ) 10.60
(1, 1, 2, 0, . . . ) 7.59
(2, 2, 0, . . . ) 9.81
(4, 0, . . . ) 15.91
(40,5) (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, . . . ) 6.51
(1, 1, 3, 0, . . . ) 11.01
(1, 4, 0, . . . ) 16.08
(1, 2, 2, 0, . . . ) 10.02
(2, 3, 0, . . . ) 13.93
(1, 1, 1, 2, 0, . . . ) 8.050
(5, 0, . . . ) 20.18
(40,6) (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, . . . ) 6.68
(1, 1, 2, 2, 0, . . . ) 10.03
(3, 3, 0, . . . ) 19.82
(2, 2, 2, 0, . . . ) 13.04
(1, 5, 0, . . . ) 23.15
(1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 0, . . . ) 8.16
(2, 4, 0, . . . ) 20.40
(1, 1, 4, 0, . . . ) 15.57
(1, 1, 1, 3, 0, . . . ) 10.91
(1, 2, 3, 0, . . . ) 13.88
(6, 0, . . . ) 35.95
(40,8) (1, 1, 6, 0, . . . ) 32.65
(1, 1, 1, 2, 3, 0, . . . ) 12.24
(4, 4, 0, . . . ) 47.54
(2, 2, 4, 0, . . . ) 23.89
(1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 0, . . . ) 9.09
(2, 2, 2, 2, 0, . . . ) 14.25
(2, 3, 3, 0, . . . ) 20.99
(1, 1, 1, 5, 0, . . . ) 21.25
(2, 6, 0, . . . ) 36.11
(1, 1, 3, 3, 0, . . . ) 17.05
(1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, . . . ) 6.484
(1, 7, 0, . . . ) 56.08
(8, 0, . . . ) 67.49
Table 3: The table shows numerically computed values of γq for different number of photons (n),
modes (m), and photon occupancy patterns.
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(m,n) Photon pattern 2γq
(20, 9) (9, 0, ..., 0) 40.84
(20, 10) (10, 0, ..., 0) 53.87
(30, 9) (9, 0, ..., 0) 73.45
(30,10) (10, 0, ..., 0) 111.5
(30,11) (11, 0, ..., 0) 124.6
(30,12) (12, 0, ..., 0) 164.7
(30,13) (13, 0, ..., 0) 201.4
(40,9) (9, 0, ..., 0) 114.5
(40,10) (10, 0, ..., 0) 161.2
(40,11) (11, 0, ..., 0) 207.2
(40,12) (12, 0, ..., 0) 259.7
(40,13) (13, 0, ..., 0) 422.1
(m,n) Photon pattern 2γq
(60,4) (4, 0, ..., 0) 16.63
(60,6) (6, 0, ..., 0) 43.59
(60,8) (8, 0, ..., 0) 112.6
(60,10) (10, 0, ..., 0) 230.2
(60,12) (12, 0, ..., 0) 500.4
(60,14) (14, 0, ..., 0) 722.7
(60,16) (16, 0, ..., 0) 1877
(60,18) (18, 0, ..., 0) 2.526 × 104
Table 4: Values of γq for the completely bunched photon configuration.
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E Mutual information for a pure loss channel
For a lossy channel with transmissivity η, the mutual information I(X;Y |K) between Alice and Bob (given
that Bob knows the secret key) can be computed explicitly. We assume that Bob measures by photo-
detection. First, we note that, since the key is independent on the both X and Y , we have I(X;Y |K) =
I(X;Y ).
If Alice sends one particular code words ψj containing n photons, Bob will get k photons with proba-
bility p(k|j) = ηk(1 −η)n−k. This is uniquely identified if Bob measures by photo-detection by k detection
events. There exists Nk =
(
n
k
)
possible measurement outputs of this kind. Therefore the conditional
entropy is
H(B|X) = −
∑
j
p(j)
∑
k
Nk p(k|j) log p(k|j) (113)
= −
∑
j
p(j)
n
∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
η
k(1 − η)n−k log
[
η
k(1 − η)n−k
]
(114)
= −
n
∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
η
k(1 − η)n−k log
[
η
k(1 − η)n−k
]
, (115)
where p(j) is the probability of code words ψj .
Now consider that Bob obtains a certain combination of k detection events over m modes. This output
is compatible with Mk =
(
m−k
n−k
)
input code words sent by Alice. As the total number of code words is
M =
(
m
n
)
, the probability of obtaining a given combination of k detections is
p(k) =
Mk
M
p(k|j) =
(
m−k
n−k
)
(
m
n
) η
k(1 − η)n−k . (116)
Note that the total number of possible outputs is N ′k =
(
m
k
)
, therefore we have
H(B) = −
n
∑
k=0
N
′
kp(k) log p(k) (117)
= −
n
∑
k=0
(
m
k
)
(
m−k
n−k
)
(
m
n
) η
k(1 − η)n−k log
[
(
m−k
n−k
)
(
m
n
) η
k(1 − η)n−k
]
(118)
= −
n
∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
η
k(1 − η)n−k log
[
(
m−k
n−k
)
(
m
n
) η
k(1 − η)n−k
]
. (119)
Finally we obtain:
I(X;BK) = −
n
∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
η
k(1 − η)n−k log
(
m−k
n−k
)
(
m
n
) (120)
= log
(
m
n
)
−
n
∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
η
k(1 − η)n−k log
(
m− k
n− k
)
. (121)
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